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THE STORY OF MR. G.: REFLECTIONS UPON
THE QUESTIONABLY COMPETENT CLIENT
Mark Spiegel*
This Article is partially the story of a case.' It is a case of mine that
had a happy outcome (or at least appears to have had one for the
client), but it took a troubling route to reach that outcome. The case
raises questions about an area in which I have written extensively-
lawyer-client decision-making.2  In particular, this case raises
questions about lawyer-client decision-making with, what my
colleague Paul Tremblay has called, questionably competent clients.3
The Article contains three parts. First, in Part I, I will describe Mr.
G.'s case. As with any description, mine presents certain problems. It
is selective and presented through my eyes. Moreover, because I
worked on the case several years ago and had no idea at the time that
I would be writing about it, my description of the case is affected by
data and memory problems. For some events I have no data other
than summaries; for others I have had to rely upon my memory.
Nevertheless, I do think it is a fair representation of the events
depicted. Moreover, I have tried to err on the side of over-
inclusiveness.
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. This project received generous
support from the Dr. Thomas F. Carney Fund.
1. Our instructions for this symposium were to present and discuss a case study.
I prefer to use the phrase "story" not because what I relate is fiction, but because it is
a version of reality presented through my lens and not necessarily a complete
description of all that happened in this particular "case." By and large, the legal
literature does not distinguish between case studies and "stories," although most of
the controversy has been over the use of stories. See infra note 82.
2 See generally Mark Spiegel, The Case of Mrs. Jones Revisited: Paternalism and
Autonomy in Lawyer-Client Counseling, 1997 BYU L. Rev. 307 [hereinafter Spiegel,
Mrs. Jones]; Mark Spiegel, Lawyers and Professional Autonomy: Reflections on
Corporate Lawyering and the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 9 W. New Eng. L Rev.
139 (1987) [hereinafter Spiegel, Corporate Lawyering]; Mark Spiegel, The New Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Lawyer-Client Decision Making and the Role of Rules in
Structuring the Lawyer-Client Dialogue, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 1003; Mark Spiegel,
Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128
U. Pa. L. Rev. 41 (1979) [hereinafter Spiegel, Lawyering].
3. Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism. Lawyer Decisionmaking
and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 515 [hereinafter Tremblay,
Persuasion and Paternalism].
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Second, in Parts II and III, I will use Mr. G's case to comment about
working with questionably competent clients. In particular, I will
focus on two troubling aspects. Part II discusses the difficulty of
making the judgment that somebody's decision-making capacity is
impaired. In so doing, I will explore two different meanings of the
term questionably competent. The term might refer to uncertainty as
to whether somebody is competent or, alternatively, it could refer to
the idea that "competence" is not an all or nothing concept, but one of
degree. I believe that our case reflected the second meaning of the
term.
Finally, Part III analyzes what to do if your client's competency is in
question. I will address what, if any, tactics that influence the client
are justified. In so doing, I will discuss the attempt to classify tactics
as persuasion, manipulation, or threats, and ultimately conclude that
this classification is not very helpful. Instead, I will look at some of
the tactics we employed in the case of Mr. G. and reach some
tentative conclusions about whether they were justified.
I. THE STORY
At the time of this case, I was working as a clinical supervisor at
Boston College Law School. The setting for the clinical work was the
Boston College Legal Assistance Bureau. The Legal Assistance
Bureau is primarily funded by Boston College Law School, but it is
also a branch of legal services in the Boston area and, at the time of
this case, received limited funding from Legal Services Corporation.
Our dual source of funding evidenced our dual commitment-provide
legal services and teach students. This story, however, is primarily a
story about my lawyering and not my supervision of students. As
such, the legal services identity and institutional setting is more
relevant than the clinical education setting. The practice of delivering
legal services to low-income persons provides the context for the
events that I will describe.4 Moreover, because I have chosen not to
focus on issues related to supervision or clinical teaching, I frequently
use the pronoun "we" in describing this case rather than attempting to
separate my behavior from the actions of the students who worked on
this case.
Marvin Gaynor' first called our office in the Fall of 1996. He had
received a notice from the local housing authority ("LHA") notifying
him that it was intending to evict him because he had interfered with
4. For a discussion of issues related to delivering legal services to low income
persons, see Special Issue, Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services to Low
Income Persons: Professional and Ethical Issues, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1713, 1713-2791
(1999).
5. 'The names in this narrative are changed in order to protect privacy and
confidentiality.
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the "quiet enjoyment" of other tenants.' The only other substantive
information in the notice was a statement that "the source of the
information we have received is correspondence" from another
tenant, Jane O'Meara. The notice also stated that our client had a
right to an informal conference.7
We scheduled an initial interview with Mr. Gaynor. At the
interview we learned that he was living at Fair Gardens, an
elderly/handicapped state subsidized housing complex. We also
discovered that he was thirty-five years old and one of two
handicapped individuals living at Fair Gardens. About eight years
earlier he had been in a motorcycle accident. Eight months after the
accident, Mr. Gaynor was discharged to a rehabilitation center in the
Boston area. He remained there for about four years. He was then
discharged to his current apartment at Fair Gardens.
The motorcycle accident was serious. Mr. Gaynor suffered multiple
injuries, including a traumatic brain injury.' He also fractured his
femur, an injury that eventually resulted in an amputation above the
knee after the wound became infected. The post-operative reports
and follow-up examinations stated that "as a result of the accident he
experiences several serious cognitive and neuro-motor impairments."9
That is what the reports said. What we experienced during that first
meeting was somewhat different. It was true that Mr. Gaynor was in a
wheelchair and exhibited slurred speech that made it very difficult to
understand him. It is also true, however, that we found him to be a
very likeable individual with a keen sense of humor. I was struck that,
rather than feeling sorry for himself, Mr. Gaynor made jokes. Maybe
that was a defense mechanism, but it made the situation easier for us.
I wanted to help him.
At the interview Mr. Gaynor told us to read a letter he had written.
A friend of his who accompanied him to the interview advised him
that, in view of his speech difficulties, it would be a good idea to
"write up his side of the story." The letter stated that: "[p]erson
named [Jane O'Meara] is barely known to me. We do not agree
about the subject of smoking in the hall. I am anti-smoking. I was
6. The notice stated he was in violation of Section 3A of his lease. Section 3A
stated that the tenant was "to live in a peaceful manner respecting the rights of
neighbors to privacy and quiet." Clause 6B of the lease stated that management may
terminate the lease at any time if the tenant interferes with the rights of other tenants.
7. The lease and State law imposed numerous procedural requirements before
the LHA could proceed with the eviction. According to the lease, the tenant had a
right to both a private conference and a hearing before the housing authority could
proceed to court. The procedural requirements under state law are set out in 760
C.M.R. § 3.00 (1978).
8. The medical reports state that a CT scan showed frontal and orbital fractures,
a subdermal hematoma, contusions to his frontal lobes, bilaterally, and to the left
posterotemporal lobe.
9. Medical report.
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told that Ms. O'Meara phoned the police to take care of an unsettled
matter between me and [Noah Bridges]"...."10
The letter went on to state that Mr. Bridges, who we later learned
was an elderly, partially deaf resident of Fair Gardens, had stolen
money from Mr. Gaynor and had entered his apartment without
permission. In addition, the letter stated that Mr. Bridges had peeped
into our client's window several times. The letter concluded by telling
us that at first Mr. Gaynor was friendly with the other tenants, but as
his troubles with Mr. Bridges increased he started having difficulties
with them as well. Moreover, although our client tried to report Mr.
Bridges to the LHA a number of times, nothing was done.
After reading the letter, we realized it said very little about any
incidents that might provide a basis for the claim that our client had
interfered with the quiet enjoyment of other tenants. It told us that
perhaps Ms. O'Meara had a motive for reporting our client and that
somehow Mr. Bridges might be involved. Next, we tried to find out
from our client what incident or incidents the notice from the LHA
might be referring to. Mr. Gaynor did not want to talk about this; he
wanted to talk about Mr. Bridges. At some point we told him that in
order to evaluate what we could do for him, we needed to know more
about what the LHA might say at the informal conference. We knew
we could get Ms. O'Meara's letter from the LHA, but we wanted to
get a sense of our client's perception of events without it being
colored by "evidence" from the other side. Finally, he told us that
there had been an incident the previous month in which he tried to
pass by in his wheelchair, but had been obstructed by Ms. O'Meara
and several other residents, including Mr. Bridges. When he could
not get by, Mr. Gaynor had taken an alternate route around them.
Ms. O'Meara and Mr. Bridges claimed that our client had become
angry, removed the leg rest from his wheel chair, and threatened Mr.
Bridges with it. Although the police had been called and had
interviewed the parties, they had chosen to do nothing.
We now had an incident, but we were not sure what to make of it.
Was this what provoked the eviction? Not knowing where to go next,
we asked our client whether there were any witnesses to this incident.
We also asked if he knew the names of the police officers involved.
We further inquired as to whether there was anyone else we could
talk to about events at Fair Gardens that he thought might be helpful.
We concluded by asking him what he wanted us to do. On this point
he was unequivocal: he wanted to stay in his apartment.
Our next step was to examine the file at the LHA. There we
discovered a somewhat different story. There was a letter from Ms.
O'Meara, dated June 6, 1996, that referred to an incident similar to
10. Letter from Mr. Gaynor, to Mark Spiegel, Professor of Law, Boston College
Law School (date) (on file with Professor Mark Spiegel).
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what our client described, but this incident had occurred in May, not
April. There was also a police report about this incident, dated May
15. The report stated that several residents had complained about our
client threatening Mr. Bridges and that these residents said our client
had removed a metal part from his wheelchair and threatened to hit
him. Ms. O'Meara's letter also described a whole series of incidents
ranging from spilling water in the common community room in June,
to leaving garbage at the entrance to the apartment. Finally, the file
revealed a history that provided support for both sides. There were a
number of complaints by residents about Mr. Gaynor and a number of
complaints by our client about Mr. Bridges.
With the informal conference about to occur in a few days, we
needed a strategy. We developed two ideas. Our first strategy was to
argue that nothing had occurred that justified eviction. To support
this theory, we would present our client's testimony and an affidavit
from one of the other tenants. As part of this argument we would try
to establish bias on the part of Ms. O'Meara. Our second idea was to
argue that the problems, if any, stemmed from difficulties between
our client and Mr. Bridges and should have been dealt with by the
LHA earlier. Moreover, there were measures that could be
implemented to prevent these situations from occurring again. As
part of this theory we would present testimony from a social worker at
our client's cognitive rehabilitation program. In addition, we would
contend that the LHA had to do more to educate the other residents
about the issues and behavior of individuals who had suffered brain
injury." This strategy would demonstrate that misunderstandings
about our client's differences were a significant part of the problem.
At the conference, the student who presented our case did an
excellent job of pressing the two arguments outlined above. We left
feeling that we would be successful, not as a result of persuading the
LHA that the incidents had not occurred, but because we convinced
the LHA that Mr. Gaynor should be given one more chance. Several
weeks later we received the notice informing us that the housing
authority would not proceed with the eviction. We phoned our client
and informed him of the results and wished him luck. We then closed
the file.
We had hoped that this first incident would be the end of Mr.
Gaynor's difficulties with the LHA. Unfortunately, that proved not to
be the case. Approximately one year later I received another call
from him. He had received a new notice from the LHA, again stating
its intention to evict him. The notice was similar to the previous one.
It told our client that he had the right to an informal hearing, and that
11. We were hoping to develop a legal argument based upon reasonable
accommodation pursuant to the the Fair Housing Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 and
the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994) (-ADA").
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he was being evicted because he had violated the terms of his lease by
"interfering with the quiet enjoyment of the other tenants under
Clause 3A."1 There was, however, one significant difference. This
notice stated that the information had been provided by the Old Town
Police Department rather than another tenant.
We had only a few days to interview Mr. Gaynor and prepare for
the informal conference. The first step was to call the LHA's attorney
to request a continuance. He would only give us one week. He also
stated that this time they were prepared to pursue this through to
eviction. Next, we obtained copies of two police reports. One
reported an incident where the police were called to the housing
complex because our client was allegedly disturbing some of the
elderly residents who were sitting outside talking. According to the
police report, when the police arrived they asked Mr. Gaynor to move
and he refused. A police officer reached down to move Mr. Gaynor's
wheel chair and a minor scuffle occurred. During this scuffle the
police officer was scratched. No charges were filed. A second
incident occurred approximately one week later. The police were
called because our client allegedly had a scuffle with Mr. Bridges in
the community room in which he tore the pocket off Mr. Bridges'
shirt. According to the police report, another resident, Martha
Rossini, witnessed this "attack."
At the interview with our client, we had some of the same
difficulties we had had during the previous interview. Mr. Gaynor's
speech difficulties made him hard to understand. Again, he primarily
wanted to talk about his past problems with Mr. Bridges and either
found it difficult to, or was reluctant to, discuss what might be
prompting the current eviction notice. Eventually he described an
incident the previous month where the police were called to Fair
Gardens. Mr. Gaynor, however, said he did not do anything wrong
and that he did not have an altercation with the police. After some
prompting, he also mentioned that the police came a second time at
the instigation of Mr. Bridges, but again he stated that he had done
nothing wrong. When we asked him if he could remember whether
anything else happened either time he just responded that Mr. Bridges
was out to get him. Because we could not obtain any more
information, we ended the interview by confirming that he still wanted
to remain at his apartment and telling him we would meet him again
before the informal conference that was scheduled a few days later.
The informal conference began with a strong statement from the
LHA about their obligation to the other tenants. The attorney then
introduced the two police reports. We did not object to the
introduction of the police reports because this was not an evidentiary
hearing and, therefore, the rules of evidence did not apply. We asked
12. See supra note 6.
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questions about whether there were other witnesses and also tried to
find out if the LHA had done anything to educate the other tenants
regarding the behavioral patterns of somebody who suffered brain
injuries. We had decided not to present testimony because we were
not sure what happened. Our client's lack of factual detail at the
interview may have indicated that nothing had actually happened, or
was the result of a memory loss, or some other explanation. The
LHA's attorney, however, asked our client several questions. First, he
asked whether our client had hit Mr. Bridges and scratched the police
officer. Our client said he had not done those things. Second, the
LHA's attorney asked our client whether he would be willing to move
if they found him another apartment. This "offer" was a surprise to
us. We had assumed that at some point moving to another housing
authority apartment would be a possible resolution, but we did not
expect the possibility to be raised at the conference. Before we could
intervene and say we would need to talk to our client before he
answered that question, Mr. Gaynor shook his head from side to side
vigorously, indicating no. At that point the conference ended.
We met with our client after the conference and explained that it
was our assessment that we would lose the informal conference and
have to go on to the next stage, a hearing before the Executive
Director of the LHA. We also explained that if we lost at that
hearing, we would then have an opportunity to request a grievance
hearing before an individual who is appointed by the LHA, but who is
not an employee of the authority. Finally, we explained to him that if
we lost the grievance hearing the LHA would still have to initiate
court proceedings to evict him. Next, we discussed the implicit offer
of another apartment. We asked him why he rejected the offer out of
hand. He replied, "I don't want to move." When we asked him why,
our client just shrugged. We then asked him whether he would take
another apartment if he had no choice because the LHA was
successful in evicting him. He said yes. We then explained that it was
our assessment that if the case went to eviction the LHA was not
likely to offer another apartment. We asked him, "Does that make a
difference?" He responded by saying, "No I am not going to lose."
We then told him we could not make an assessment of the case
because at that point we felt that we did not know enough about the
case. We also asked his permission to call the lawyer for the LHA to
discuss what he meant when he asked our client if he would take
another apartment. He said, "We can do that, but I will not move."
The meeting ended with us stating we would like to do more
investigation and then meet with him again.
As expected, we lost the informal conference and then made our
request for a hearing before the Executive Director of the LHA. In
the interim, we conducted more investigation. We talked to the police
officers. Their stories were consistent with the police reports. We did
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learn, however, that the police officers did not witness any of the
events between our client and other residents. They were adamant,
however, that our client was trying to hit one of the officers when the
officer was scratched. Charges were not filed because they felt sorry
for our client.
We attempted to talk to other residents of Fair Gardens, but they
would not talk to us, other than to say that Mr. Gaynor "scares" them.
We also talked to the attorney for the LHA about whether the agency
would offer our client another appropriate apartment. He responded
that there was nothing to talk about because our client had rejected
the idea of moving to another apartment. We then said, "Well if we
had something concrete to show him, it might make a difference."
The attorney replied, "There is nothing available and there is no sense
in exploring options unless you can guarantee your client would
consider moving." We told him we could not guarantee that, but we
would speak to our client further about the matter.
At our next meeting with our client, we told him what we had
discovered and that we were not optimistic about the results. We told
him that we could win, but that it was far from a sure thing. We then
returned to the discussion of accepting another apartment. He
responded by flatly stating, "I don't want to move." We then asked
him whether he would at least look at another apartment if one was
available. He said he would look, but not move. We also asked if he
would consider behavioral modification with a psychiatrist or
medication. We had learned from our client's current social worker
that these were measures that might ameliorate our client's problem
with what the mental health professionals call impulse control, i.e. the
tendency to lose control of one's temper. We thought that if he would
do either of these things, it would strengthen a reasonable
accommodation argument under the Fair Housing Act and the
ADA. 3 Our client responded, "No, I am not crazy. I will not go to a
psychiatrist. The medication will give me diarrhea. I have discussed it
and will not take it." We then asked, "What if doing these things will
help your case; would that matter?" He replied that his case did not
need any help.
In December 1997, we had the first of three sessions before the
Executive Director of the LHA. Our expectation, as with the
informal conference, was that we would lose this hearing. Our major
goal, therefore, was to use the hearing for discovery. Our secondary
goal was to convince the LHA that we were serious about defending
the eviction. At this first session the only testimony presented was
from the police officers. Their testimony was consistent with what we
knew from our conversations with them, and from the police reports.
The student on the case questioned the officers about what training
13. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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they had in dealing with people suffering from disabilities, particularly
brain injuries. We were hoping to develop an argument that the
altercation with the police occurred because the police were not
trained to deal with individuals with brain injuries.
Between the first part of the hearing before the Executive Director
and the second part, several events occurred. The rehabilitation
agency working with our client offered him housing located in an area
about ninety miles from where he was living. Our client rejected this
possibility of alternative housing because it was too far from the
people he knew. He also stated again that he was going to win his
case. The social worker from the agency was upset with his decision
and mentioned filing papers to have our client declared incompetent
based upon his refusal to accept the offer of housing. We attempted
to dissuade him from taking any action, explaining that unwise
decisions do not prove incompetence. We also told the social worker
that if he attempted to proceed, we would fight it on our client's
behalf. Privately we were outraged that he would consider this. We
also heard from the LHA attorney who told us that if an appropriate
handicapped-accessible apartment became available he would allow
our client to look at it; but our client would have only a very short
time to decide before the apartment was offered to the next person on
the waiting list.
During the second and third sessions of the hearing we heard from
the -witnesses to the alleged events-the elderly residents of Fair
Gardens. The results were mixed. The good news for our client was
that many of the witnesses had obvious memory problems and said
contradictory things. In addition, not all of them had witnessed the
events. There were, however, two witnesses who did tell consistent,
coherent stories; one witness for each incident. We felt that if
believed, these witnesses could support an argument that our client
had waved the metal part of his wheel chair at a group of residents in
what they perceived to be a threatening manner, and pulled the
buttons off Mr. Bridges' shirt. We could have argued that these
incidents were not serious enough to constitute breaches of the lease.
On the other hand, we were not confident about what would happen
in court when two "little old ladies" testified. We decided to renew
our efforts to discuss with our client the option of accepting another
apartment in the same town.
We held a series of meetings wvith him over the next two months. In
those meetings, we refused to accept his beginning statement that he
would not move. The conversation proceeded as follows.
"Why?"
"Because this is the apartment they gave me when I left the rehab
program. It was meant for me."
"We understand this apartment is important to you, that it means
living independently, but any new apartment we would get for you
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would mean living independently."
"I like where I live-I want to be near my friends."
"Any new apartment would be near your friends. We think there is
a good chance you will lose your case."
"I will win."
"Do you want to be homeless."
"I don't care. I want to stay here."
We kept each of these meetings going as long as we thought there
was a chance that he might change his mind. The meetings always
ended with Mr. Gaynor saying, "I don't want to move."
At the beginning of March 1998, the LHA attorney called and said
that there was another apartment for our client. We met with our
client again and asked if he would look at the apartment. At first he
said no. We reminded him that several months earlier he said he
would look at an apartment if one became available. He said: "Okay,
but I will not move." Our client looked at the apartment which was
located in a handicapped housing complex located about one to two
miles from his apartment. Afterwards, we met with him and asked if
he would consider moving to the apartment.
'No."
"Why?"
"I like my apartment, it's the one I was sent to by the rehab people.
The new one has too many handicapped people."
We then rehashed much of the previous discussions regarding his
chances of success and our concerns about him becoming homeless.
The conversation ended with us asking if he would think about it and
meet with us again later that week to discuss the matter further.
In the interim, several of Mr. Gaynor's friends called. With his
permission, we spoke to them about the case and told them that if
they thought that it would be good for him to move, they should talk
to him about it. We met with Mr. Gaynor for about ninety minutes
later that week. At the end of the meeting our client finally said he
would take the new apartment. Although we sensed we had worn him
down, we accepted his statement as authority to negotiate a
settlement agreement and told him we would come back with an
agreement from the housing authority for his approval. We
comforted ourselves with the thought that even if he felt coerced he
could back out by not signing the agreement.
We negotiated an agreement that provided him with a new
apartment and resolved the dispute. The agreement, however, also
provided that if either side failed to perform, the eviction process
would continue where it left off, with the parties awaiting the decision
of the Executive Director. Under the agreement, our client would not
lose his apartment until he actually moved. We presented this
1188 [Vol. 69
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agreement to him. He balked. We reminded him that he had already
agreed. He eventually signed, but two weeks later he repudiated the
agreement and refused to move. The LHA subsequently notified us
that they would proceed with the eviction.
I left our office that spring with Mr. Gaynor's case still pending. My
expectation was that the case would be litigated either over that
Summer or the following Fall semester. What actually happened was
that the LHA did not proceed and our client remained in his
apartment. There was one further incident the following year, but Mr.
Gaynor is still at Fair Gardens as of the writing of this article some
two years later.
II. COMPETENCE
What, if any, lessons can we draw from Mr. Gaynor's story? To
some extent that depends upon what parts of the story we choose to
emphasize. 4 The part of the story that I am interested in is the
interaction between the attorneys, myself included, and Mr. Gaynor,
the client, over the issue of whether he should have accepted the
settlement offer of alternative housing. These interactions can be
viewed as part of the larger issue of who controls decisions: the
lawyer or the client. As previously noted, I have written extensively
on this topic.15 What made this case both different and problematic
for me, was that Mr. Gaynor was questionably competent, at least
from some perspectives.16  Moreover, he was making what the
students who worked on the case and I perceived to be an unwise
choice by rejecting the offer of alternative housing.
The model of lawyer-client decision-making that has been
advocated by academics such as myself, presupposes a lawyer who
presents options to her client and a client who then chooses among
14. The discussion of this case could have focused on issues such as our
competence in representing Mr. Gaynor, including such questions as whether we were
undervaluing the Fair Housing Act and the ADA defenses or whether we litigated
aggressively enough at the informal hearing. I could have used it to discuss resource
allocation questions, such as whether this was a case worth devoting considerable
resources given our other obligations. It also raised questions about our obligations
to third parties, such as the other elderly tenants, particularly if one believed that our
client could be dangerous. Finally, we were convinced that part of our client's
aversion to Mr. Bridges stemmed from our client's homophobia. Was this an issue we
should have aggressively confronted him about?
15. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
16. Similar issues have been discussed in the context of elderly and juvenile
clients. See generally Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of
Counsel for Children, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1399 (1996); Peter Margulies, The Lawyer
as Caregiver: Child Client's Competence in Context, 64 Fordham L Rev. 1473 (1996);
Peter Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice: A Contextual Approach To
Representing Senior Citizens Of Questionable Capacity, 62 Fordham L Rev. 1073
(1994) [hereinafter Margulies, Access]; Linda F. Smith, Representing the Elderly Client
and Addressing the Question Of Competence, 14 J. Contemp. L 61 (1988).
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those options.17  This model is not without its critics 18 or its
complications. For example, one issue is to what extent clients get to
choose the means by which the ends of representation are achieved.
Moreover, even those who advocate an autonomy perspective
recognize that there are important limits to a client's control over her
lawyer. A client cannot force her lawyer to violate the law or
professional codes and rules.19 Where the client's actions might harm
third parties, the lawyer may have latitude to refuse to participate.20
The lawyer may also have an interest in her own workmanship or
craftsmanship. 21 Finally, one might argue that corporate clients
should be treated differently from individual clients because of both
the corporate client's increased ability to harm others and because
organizations, unlike individuals, do not have autonomy interests. 2
But by and large, the autonomy viewpoint rejects the idea that
lawyers have the right to make decisions for clients, even for the
clients' own benefit. Under this view, paternalism in order to protect
the client from bad choices is not justified.
The one limited exception to this anti-paternalistic stance is when
the client is incompetent.' This exception is easy to apply when a
court has already made a finding of incompetency.24 In those cases,
the lawyer simply treats the guardian as the client's decision maker. If
the court has not made a finding of incompetency, however, this
17. See e.g., Douglas E. Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge? 8 (1974)(discussing the client participation model); Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered
Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 Ariz. L. Rev. 501, 584-603 (1990)(proposing variations to the client-centered approach); Susan R. Martyn, Informed
Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 307, 310 (1980) (outlining
informed consent as a standard for enforcing competency in the legal profession);
Judith L. Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 17 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1049, 1052 (1984) (examining the joint
venture model of client-lawyer relationships); Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised
Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. Rev.
315, 317 (1987) (arguing for the adoption of informed consent); supra note 2 (listing
articles advocating this model of lawyer-client decision-making).
18. See Spiegel, Mrs. Jones, supra note 2, at 308 (discussing some of the critiques).
19. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.16(a)(1) (1983) [hereinafter Model Rules].
See Spiegel, Lawyering, supra note 2, at 117-20.
20. See Model Rules, supra note 19, R. 1.16(6) (allowing withdrawal in certain
situations).
21. See Spiegel, Lawyering, supra note 2, at 117.
22. See Spiegel, Corporate Lawyering, supra note 2, at 151-52.
23. See Margulies, Access, supra note 16, at 1075; Tremblay, Persuasion and
Paternalism, supra note 3, at 570. Professor Rein dissents from this reliance on
competence as a tool for deciding when a lawyer might intervene to override a client's
decision. Jan Ellen Rein, Clients with Destructive and Socially Harmfid Choices-
What's an Attorney to Do?: Within and Beyond the Competency Construct, 62
Fordham L. Rev. 1101 (1994). Although I disagree with Professor Rein's conclusions,
I believe she correctly notes that "[m]ost articles do not discuss why they focus solely
on the competency question." Id. at 1105 n.11.
24. Cf. Smith, supra note 16, at 80 ("[T]he totally incompetent client.. . presents
the lawyer with few dilemmas.").
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exception presents difficult problems in practice. Mr. Gaynor's case
illustrates these difficult problems.
Our first problem was assessing whether Mr. Gaynor was
competent. What should a lawyer do when a lawyer believes that a
client may be incompetent, but no court has made a finding to that
effect? Model Rule 1.14(b) states that a lawyer may seek a guardian
when the lawyer "reasonably believes the client cannot adequately act
in the client's own interest."' Rule 1.14, however, does not help the
lawyer very much in determining how to exercise the discretion the
word "may" gives her.26 The comments to Rule 1.14 suggest some
reasons why one might not seek a guardian. The comments state that
in many circumstances appointment of a legal representative may be
expensive or traumatic for the client. The comments further note that
evaluating the considerations of whether to seek the appointment of a
guardian is "a matter of professional judgment on the lawyer's part."'
After reading Rule 1.14 our reaction was that it was not helpful. It
was not just that it gave us discretion because the comments
ultimately left the question of whether to seek a guardian to our
professional judgment; but in our case, the considerations the
comments suggested -expense and trauma-seemed unresponsive to
our basic concerns. In relating the story of Mr. Gaynor's case I
mentioned that at one point his social worker stated that his agency
was considering seeking the appointment of a guardian and that we
were outraged by this suggestion. But why? If we had doubts about
his decision-making capacity and the decisions he was making, why
should it bother us that others would have similar doubts and want to
act on those doubts?
I think there were two reasons. First, the appointment of a
guardian seemed to us the ultimate act of disloyaltyY. Somebody
came to us for help. That the request would result in our imposing
significant limitations on his liberty seemed treacherous to us. Now,
the fact that it felt treacherous does not mean that it would have been.
Sometimes one has an obligation to tell another person what you
perceive to be the truth even if they do not want to hear it. Moreover,
that obligation seems strongest when that person lacks the capacity to
make decisions for themselves. It is, however, one thing to "speak the
truth" to loved ones, friends, or clients and another to take the
additional step of taking action that might result in a significant
curtailment of the client's ability to make choices for himself.
25. Model Rules, supra note 19, R. 1.14(b).
26. Id. at R. 1.14. For discussions and critique of Rule 1.14, see generally James
R. Devine, The Ethics of Representing the Disabled Client: Does Model Rule 1.14
Adequately Resolve the Best Interests/Advocacy Dilemma?, 49 Mo. L Rev. 493 (1984);
Tremblay, Persuasion and Paternalism, supra note 3. at 544-47.
27. Model Rules, supra note 19, R. 1.14 cmt. 3.
28. See Tremblay, Persuasion and Paternalism, supra note 3, at 559-61.
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The second reason we were outraged by the social worker's attempt
to appoint a guardian for Mr. Gaynor was that he did not seem to us
to be a client who was incompetent, at least in the legal sense of the
term. Also, he did not appear to be, to use the language of Rule 1.14,
somebody who necessarily could not act adequately in his best
interests. But we were not sure this was the case; he might fit those
definitions. Hence the utility of the label "questionably competent."
In one sense, therefore, the problem we had was uncertainty. What
degree of certitude did we need before we could seriously consider the
guardianship option?29 In theory, we could resolve our dilemma by
submitting the issue to a court. But allowing a court to resolve our
uncertainty is not satisfactory in a situation such as this where the very
act of asking for a guardianship has consequences. Another
possibility in a case of uncertainty is to consult outside experts.30 We
exercised this option in Mr. Gaynor's case. With his permission, we
discussed his case with his current mental health providers and with a
neuro-psychiatrist who had treated him in the past. We discovered,
however, that this approach has limited utility.31 First, we received
inconsistent judgments. The current providers were most concerned
with protecting him and, therefore, in our judgment, conflated what
they perceived to be the harmful decision he was making with
competence. 32 The neuro-psychiatrist focused on process factors to
reach his conclusion that our client's capacity to make decisions, while
impaired, did not constitute incapacity.33 But it was not only the
inconsistency that made consultation unhelpful; it was also the
realization that the decision about what to do was ultimately ours.
Regardless of what an expert would tell us, it was still only
information that would assist us in exercising our professional
judgment.
29. For a discussion of this issue from a medical perspective, see Robert P. Roca,
Determining Decisional Capacity: A Medical Perspective, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1177
(1994).
30. See Model Rules, supra note 19, R 1.14 cmt. 5; see also Introduction to Report
of the Working Group on Determining the Child's Capacity to Make Decisions, 64
Fordham L. Rev. 1339, 1340 (1996) ("In making the decision regarding capacity, the
lawyer should seek guidance from appropriate professionals .... "); Margulies,
Access, supra note 16, at 1092-93.
31. See Smith, supra note 16, at 84-85 (discussing reasons why reliance on experts
may not resolve the problems an attorney faces in determining a client's competence).
Smith recommends utilizing experts to assist in the interviewing and counseling
process. Id. at 85.
32. See Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering and De Facto Guardians, 62
Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1439 n.41 (1994) [hereinafter Tremblay, Impromptu
Lawyering] ("[L]iterature... tends to assert that the psychiatric profession comes to
competence questions with certain biases... and thus would be more likely to
conclude that a harmful decision by a person is not a competent one.").
33. See Margulies, Access, supra note 16, at 1083-84 (discussing the use of process
factors to judge competency).
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Mr. Gaynor's case confronted us with a deeper problem, however.
This deeper problem exposed an ambiguity in the term questionably
competent. At times the term seems to mean, as discussed above, that
there is uncertainty or a question as to whether we have enough
evidence to determine a client's competence. But the term took on a
different meaning for us in representing Mr. Gaynor. Because, in this
case, his competence was not a question of yes or no, but one of
degree.
Viewing competence as a question of degree has been criticized by
Professors Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock.-' They state that it is
important to reject the notion that competence can be regarded as a
matter of degree because of the function of competence decisions
within the area that they are analyzing-informed consent for health
care decisions." To Buchanan and Brock competence serves as a
means to sort persons into two classes: (1) those whose voluntary
decisions must be respected and accepted by others as binding; and
(2) those whose decisions will be set aside and for whom others will
act as surrogate decision-makers.36
I agree with them that competence decisions perform this sorting
function. I disagree, however, that this sorting is the only function
that competence plays. As stated above, we had resolved the question
of whether we thought Mr. Gaynor was legally incompetent. That
still, however, left the question of how to treat a client who we felt was
somewhat impaired. Buchanan and Brock do acknowledge that
"patients' degrees of decision-making capacities" may affect how
physicians treat patients,- so perhaps our difference is only semantic.
They would allow variation in treatment, but simply not use the
language of competence.m Nevertheless, because it has been used
previously in the literature, I will continue to use the language of
competence and the phrase questionably competent for purposes of
this Article.
Why, however, did we feel that Mr. Gaynor's competence was one
of degree? There were two main reasons. First, there was no doubt in
our mind that he was competent to make many decisions. Our doubts
were with his ability to make this particular decision regarding his
34. Allen E. Buchanan & Dan W. Brock, Deciding for Others: The Ethics of
Surrogate Decision Making 27 (1989).
35. Id at 28.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 28-29.
38. Buchanan and Brock's book does not discuss the issue of what they mean by
physicians being able to take account of the degree of decision-making capability in
determining how they treat patients. They do, however, state that if a patient is
competent as they define it, the patient's decision must not be coerced or
manipulated. Id. at 26. What that might mean and whether that is possible or even
desirable in a case such as Mr. Gaynor's is discussed in Part IlI of this article.
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housing because of his animosity/obsession with Mr. Bridges.3 9 He
frequently told us that moving meant Mr. Bridges would win.4"
Perhaps if Mr. Bridges was not involved, Mr. Gaynor's assessment of
the situation would have been different. When a client seems
competent in many domains, it is difficult to attribute incompetence to
the client and even more difficult to attribute it to a particular
decision. The assumption, of course, is that if somebody can think
rationally sometimes, why not all the time.
The second reason why we viewed our client's competence as a
question of degree was that even in making the decision to reject the
offer of alternative housing, Mr. Gaynor was able to state coherent
reasons for his decision. David Luban has argued that one way to
assess a client's decision-making capacity is to see "if any process is
going on in the person's head that can be called 'inference from real
facts."'41 Mr. Gaynor easily met that test of capacity. He had good
reasons for refusing to move: he liked where he lived, he did not want
to live among only disabled people, and he had an understandable
emotional attachment to his apartment. Even his feelings about Mr.
Bridges would seem to meet Luban's test. Revenge or obsession may
not be admirable motives, but they do not necessarily equate with lack
of competence. Such feelings are certainly within the range of reasons
that the legal system is designed to accommodate. Indeed, it is better
to seek revenge within the legal system than resort to self-help.
There are, however, other aspects of decision-making. 2  In
particular, Mr. Gaynor seemed to be ignoring the consequences of his
decision by assuming that he would win his case no matter what.
Luban's model correctly allows a client to trade-off the risk of losing
against the gains to be achieved by adopting a risky course of action.
So it would be acceptable (in my opinion) 3 for Mr. Gaynor to have
39. Competence is increasingly viewed as "competence for some task-
competence to do something." Buchanan & Brock, supra note 34, at 18. See also
Model Rules, supra note 19, R. 1.14 cmt. 1 ("[S]ome persons... can be quite capable
of handling routine financial matters while needing special legal protection
concerning major transactions.").
40. When we stated that he would not be losing to Mr. Bridges by accepting the
alternative housing since he was still going to have housing from the Old Town
Housing Authority, it had no impact. Moving was losing.
41. David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 454,
479. According to Luban it would be "too much to require that the inference be
valid, or objective, or correct, for that is more than competent people can manage."
Id.; see also Margulies, Access, supra note 16, at 1085 ("[A] client should be able to
give reasons for her decision.").
42. Competence involves a number of different capacities. See Buchanan and
Brock, supra note 34, at 23-25 (discussing various components of the capacity to make
decisions such as understanding, the ability to appreciate the nature and meaning of
potential alternatives, the capacity for reasoning and deliberation, and the weighing of
values).
43. 1 say "in my opinion" because this case re-taught me that it is difficult to
predict our own behavior until we are faced with a concrete situation.
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said "I know I am likely to lose, but this apartment is so important to
me that I am willing to run the risk of going homeless." What we
perceived, however, was a client who simply refused to acknowledge
the reality of his situation. To us he was like the elderly client who
refuses to recognize that if he does not contest a foreclosure action he
will be homeless."
But was Mr. Gaynor like this? William Simon has stated that one
reason lawyers retreat from paternalism and emphasize the autonomy
viewpoint is that "it absolves them of the burdens of connection and
the responsibilities of power."4 5 If we retreated at all in this case,
however, I think it was precisely in the opposite direction: toward
paternalism and away from respecting our client's autonomy. We did
not want to feel responsible for our client becoming homeless because
of our failure to intervene or persuade him to accept the settlement
offer. Given this feeling, the question that arises in retrospect is
whether we were undervaluing Mr. Gaynor's case because we were
afraid of the consequences? I do not think so. The ultimate results,
however, suggest otherwise. Our client is still in his apartment.
Perhaps he was right. As a colleague has pointed out to me, maybe
Mr. Gaynor was better at predicting the ultimate actions of the LHA.
Maybe he knew in a way we did not that the LHA did not want to be
responsible for evicting a tenant who had a brain injury.
To recapitulate, we thought our client was competent because he
was capable of making many decisions and he had good reasons for
the decision he was making. In addition, maybe he had a better idea
of the realistic consequences than we did. So why did we feel justified
in treating him as an individual whose decision-making competence
was impaired? One obvious reason was his head injury. Another
reason was our belief that he never understood the reality of his
situation-that if the LHA was persistent they could evict him. But I
would be guilty of being less than candid if I did not acknowledge that
it was also the substance of his decision that troubled us. Our doubts
about his competency would have been set aside if he had made what
we perceived to be the "safe" decision. Does this mean we were
guilty of allowing our disagreement with our client's decision to be the
ultimate deciding factor and, therefore, justifying paternalism through
a circular process of allowing the "bad" decision to become the proof
of lack of competency? Perhaps. I would like to think, however, that
although to some extent we could not resist taking account of the
consequences to our client,46 it was justified because we did have
44. The example is from Margulies, Access, supra note 16, at 1037.
45. William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50
Md. L. Rev. 213,225 (1991).
46. Robert Roca has written regarding doctors:
In practice, the examiner cannot resist taking into account the consequences
of the decision the patient is making. If the patient's decision has little
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independent evidence of impairment. Our approach was an attempt
to consider both process and substance, an approach written about by
Peter Margulies.47 It is, of course, true that as soon as one introduces
the "substance" of a decision into the question of whether to
intervene in a client's decision, there is real danger of over
inclusiveness. The lawyer may get it wrong. In this case we may have
gotten it wrong. I will leave that to others to judge. Not to introduce
substance, however, has its own dangers. Process, by itself, can only
tell us so much. Moreover, if the introduction of substance is
inevitable, it is better to acknowledge that fact and the dangers that
accompany it rather than pretend otherwise.
III. WHAT IS LEGITIMATE PERSUASION?
With clients whose decision-making is not impaired, the goal or
ideal is that the decisions they make should be their own. As I have
written elsewhere, however, lawyers inevitably influence their clients'
choices. There is no completely neutral way to present the necessary
information to a client and describe that information.48 Nevertheless,
the lawyer's intent can and should be to facilitate the client's
autonomous choices.49 The critical difference in Mr. Gaynor's case
was that our intent was not to facilitate his choice, but to have him
choose the option of accepting alternative housing. My justification
for treating Mr. Gaynor differently is in the previous section. Even
assuming that our justification for treating Mr. Gaynor differently is
legitimate, that still leaves open the question of whether our methods
of influencing Mr. Gaynor's choice were acceptable. 0
Some literature suggests that in appropriate cases the lawyer can
proceed as a de facto guardian when her clients suffer from some
degree of impaired decision-making disability.5 1 Regardless of the
validity of that argument in situations where it has been advocated,52 it
potential for causing harm, then a moderate degree of uncertainty regarding
capacity is tolerable. On the other hand, if the patient is likely to be
seriously harmed or to lose out on substantial benefit by virtue of her
decision, then the examiner will tolerate much less uncertainty regarding
decisional capacity.... The consequences of the patient's choice thus enter
into the process of determining decisional capacity ....
Roca, supra note 29, at 1189.
47. Margulies, Access, supra note 16, at 1075.
48. Spiegel, Mrs. Jones, supra note 2, at 325-26.
49. Id. at 332-36.
50. The Model Rules state "It]he fact that a client suffers a disability does not
diminish the lawyer's obligation to treat the client with attention and respect." Model
Rules, supra note 19, R. 1.14 cmt. 2.
51. See Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering, supra note 32, at 1435-38; Model Rules,
supra note 19, R. 1.14 cmt. 2.
52. The hypothetical that spawned this suggestion was an emergency situation
where the lawyer had to act immediately or the client would suffer. Tremblay,
Impromptu Lawyering, supra note 32, at 1430 n.3.
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was not a practical suggestion in our case." Even if we assumed that
somehow we had the authority to accept a settlement on behalf of our
client, we had no way to carry out its terms. We could not physically
move him into another apartment. The practical question we faced
was what, if any, other tactics to influence our client's decision were
justifiable?
One way of answering this question is to attempt to classify the
behavior we engaged in as either persuasion, manipulation, or
coercion. Under this approach, behavior that is manipulation or
coercion is presumptively bad; persuasive tactics are more likely to be
seen as justified.' This basic approach works reasonably well with
coercion. Although coercion is difficult to define, the core meaning
implies the use of threats." In the lawyer-client context, the classic
example of coercion is a lawyer threatening to withdraw if a client
refuses to do what the lawyer feels is warranted.' As Stephen
Ellmann has stated, however, coercion is usually not a problem in the
lawyer-client context.'
This labeling approach does not work as well when we are analyzing
behavior that might be called manipulative. Although we can give
core examples of manipulation such as lying, distorting, or
withholding information,58 beyond these clear-cut examples the term
is extremely difficult to define. Indeed, in their work on informed
consent, Faden and Beauchamp avoid the question of definition by
stipulating that manipulation involves tactics intended to change the
behavior of another that do not fit the definition of persuasion or
coercion. 9  In addition, the range of behaviors that arguably
encompass manipulation covers a broad spectrum of behavior and
occurs more frequently in the lawyer-client relationship.
53. I also do not think it would have been justified given the degree of Mr.
Gaynor's impairment.
54. Ruth R. Faden & Tom L. Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed
Consent 337-46 (1986); see also Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L
Rev. 717, 721 (1987) (arguing that coercion and manipulation require justification
because they may breach the principles of client-centered lawyering); Tremblay,
Persuasion and Paternalism, supra note 3, at 581-83 (accepting persuasion but
condemning coercion or manipulation).
55. See Alan Wertheimer, Coercion 204 (1987) ("[TJhe intuitive answer is threats
are coercive while offers are not."). Ellmann defines coercion as the situation where
"one person... in order to alter the other's behavior.., threatens to bring about
undesirable consequences for the other person, and the other person alters his behavior
accordingly, at least in part as a result of the threat." Ellmann, supra note 54, at 723.
What we mean by threat is not unproblematic. See Wertheimer, supra, at 205-21
(discussing the issue); see also Ellmann, supra note 54, at 724-25 (recognizing that the
definition of "threat" may depend on the circumstances).
56. See Ellmann, supra note 54, at 724.
57. See id. at 726.
58. See id.
59. Faden & Beauchamp, supra note 54, at 261,354.
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Because the definitional approach to manipulation is so slippery,
another way of approaching this question is to ask why we care. What
is at stake in labeling behavior as manipulation or persuasion? To ask
the question is to answer it. It is hard to defend manipulation. The
very label is pejorative. Once we have labeled something as
manipulation we have gone a long way toward condemning it.' But
knowing we are condemning something does not explain why we
might want to condemn it. To answer that question it might be
helpful to look at the behaviors we are analyzing from two different
perspectives: their effect upon the lawyer and their effect upon the
client.
One possible reason for condemning manipulation is the effect on
the manipulator. To the extent one presents a false self to another,
lies, or distorts the truth, there is a harm caused to one's own
integrity.61 This lends support for the condemnation associated with
what I called the core cases of manipulation-those involving lying,
distorting, or withholding information.
If we look at the effect of the lawyer's behavior from the client's
perspective, the reason we might care about or criticize various
behaviors is that we are trying to limit the infringement on the client's
autonomy. Consistent with this concern, some authors who discuss
manipulation adopt the theory that manipulation is an influence that
exerts some measure of control over another person's decision.62 I
agree that the degree of control is the central issue from the client's
perspective.63 The problem I have with the idea that control is the
critical determinant is that it does not sufficiently distinguish
manipulation from persuasion, unless one adopts a very specialized
usage of each of these terms.6r In both cases, the goal is to change the
60. See John K. Morris, Power and Responsibility Among Lawyers and Clients:
Comment on Ellmann's Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 781, 800 n.78 (1987).
But see Faden & Beauchamp, supra note 54, at 354 (attempting to discuss
manipulation in a way that liberates it from "connotations of immorality or
unfairness").
61. See Spiegel, Mrs. Jones, supra note 2, at 335; cf Gary Bellow & Bea Moulton,
The Lawyering Process: Materials for Clinical Instruction in Advocacy 404-07 (1978)
(setting out and discussing the "transcript" of a conversation in a bar between an
attorney representing a defendant in a narcotics case and the undercover agent who
made the arrest). According to the transcript, the lawyer obtains information from
the agent that results in dismissal of the charges against his client. Id. Bellow and
Moulton ask a series of questions which allow one to consider the effect upon the
lawyer treating somebody with respect and consideration where that posture is used
solely to gain cooperation and results in harm to the other person. Id. at 406-07.
62. See Faden & Beauchamp, supra note 54, at 258; see also Ellmann, supra note
54, at 727-28 (discussing the extent to which manipulators can affect the choices made
by their clients).
63. I am assuming that the behavior or alleged manipulation is not a case of the
lawyer attempting to use the client for her own ends.
64. See Faden & Beauchamp, supra note 54, at 347-48 (acknowledging the
differences between their definition of persuasion and that of other authors).
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client's mind.' If this goal or intention is the problem, then
persuasion cannot be distinguished from manipulation. Moreover,
although it might be argued that manipulation is likely to be more
successful at overcoming the client's will, I do not believe that is
necessarily the case. Manipulation, if discovered, is more likely to be
resisted than persuasive appeals.
The key distinction these authors offer appears to be that
persuasive appeals still allow the client to make up her own mind
while manipulation does not.66 The reasons offered for drawing this
distinction, however, are not very convincing. First, persuasion is
claimed to be non-controlling because it involves appeals to reason
rather than emotion. But this line of argument presents a number of
difficulties. For one, it artificially separates reason from emotion.
Such an argument also implies that emotional or psychological
reasons are not valid reasons for doing something,67 and it further
assumes that we can never be seduced by reason.
Second, it is argued that clients can resist persuasion, but may not
be able to resist manipulation. But if the manipulation does not
involve deceit it would seem that the client can resist manipulation
just as well as a client can resist persuasion. Indeed, it is not obvious
to me that manipulation is inherently more likely to be successful than
persuasion. On the other hand, if the manipulation is secretive and
involves deceit the client may find it harder to resist because she does
not know about it. To the extent tactics involve deceit, however, it is
easy to condemn them without attempting to get into difficult
evaluations as to what extent the tactic undercuts the client's decision-
making capability. 68
It is harder to make judgments about tactics that are not so easily
classified as involving deceit or trickery. At what point does the
degree of control or influence exercised become unwarranted? Mr.
Gaynor's case presents some examples. I will discuss three tactics we
used that present questions to me about whether we overstepped the
line: (1) we constantly emphasized the dangers of litigating, including
advising him that we thought he had greater than a fifty percent
chance of losing; (2) we minimized the feelings he had that it was
important not to allow Mr. Bridges to win; and (3) we did not accept
at face value his statements that he did not want to move.69
65. See Dinerstein, supra note 17, at 569 (discussing the use of persuasion as a
control technique).
66. Faden & Beauchamp, supra note 54, at 259 (stating that when one is
persuaded "one willingly acts or accepts a belief as one's own").
67. See Luban, supra note 41, at 475-76.
68. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
69. Other tactics we used that arguably crossed the line were: persuading him to
look at the apartment that was offered even though he told us he was not interested;
having him sign an agreement that he could back out of: and encouraging his friends
to call him to give him advice where we knew the advice would be that he should
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Was it wrong to constantly emphasize to Mr. Gaynor the dangers of
litigating, including telling him that we thought he had less than a fifty
percent chance of winning at the trial court level? One possible
criticism of this tactic was that we incorrectly assessed his chance of
winning. Mr. Gaynor had a better chance of prevailing than we
thought because we either overvalued the risks to fulfill our own
needs or did not accurately assess the housing authority's
unwillingness to proceed." If we incorrectly assessed his likelihood of
success, our lawyering should be criticized. In that case, the ethical
problem would be competence, however, not interfering with our
client's decision-making authority. Also, if we knowingly distort or
deceive our client about his chances of winning, even in order to
achieve beneficial ends, we have acted unethically. 1 But assuming
neither of these is the case, does providing accurate information to a
client present ethical difficulties? I think not. Accurately telling a
client that he has little chance of winning his case not only does not
present ethical problems,72 but would seem to be ethically required.
That, however, does not end the discussion. One can present
accurate information or consequences in ways that are problematic.73
For example, a physician could continually emphasize a small risk that
she knew would distort a patient's decision-making process. Professor
William Simon described a case in which a client had to choose
whether to accept a plea bargain or go to court to get justice.74 Simon
tried to illustrate that the order in which negative effects were
presented to a client plays a role in the client's ultimate decision.75
Our discussions with Mr. Gaynor raised both issues: ordering and
emphasis. We tended to end our meetings with Mr. Gaynor by
discussing the risk of litigating. Moreover, there was no doubt that we
put significant emphasis on this risk. But did we go too far? Did the
emphasis and ordering distort his decision-making? Unfortunately, it
is difficult to answer this question without making a judgment about
our client's competence or willingness to listen to negative
information. It was our judgment that Mr. Gaynor would not listen to
the negative parts of his case, and therefore, our emphasis was
justified as a compensation for his unwillingness to listen. At the time,
this seemed to be the right thing to do. In retrospect, I realize that our
move.
70. See supra Part II.
71. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
72. See Ellmann, supra note 54, at 724 (accurately telling a client that the statute
of limitations is about to expire is not coercion).
73. See e.g., Faden & Beauchamp, supra note 54, at 362-65 (discussing information
manipulation).
74. Simon, supra note 45, at 215.
75. Id. at 215-16. See also Faden & Beauchamp, supra note 54, at 320 (evidencing
different responses where information about outcomes was framed in terms of
probability of surviving or probability of dying).
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behavior raises several questions. One takes us back to the discussion
in Part II. If we view Mr. Gaynor as being somewhat competent, but
also somewhat incompetent, were we correct that he could not
comprehend the consequences? Or were we simply disagreeing with
his "bad" decision? Second, did Mr. Gaynor have a right not to listen
to the risks? Even if one accepts our judgment that he did not have
the right to be oblivious to the negative consequences, this case
illustrates that it is very hard in the real world of practice to
distinguish between a client's unwillingness to listen to the risks and
the client's willingness to assume risks that the lawyer may think are
unwarranted.76
In addition to emphasizing the risk of accepting the offer to our
client, we also attempted to explain to him why the things he said he
valued could be achieved by accepting the offer of alternative housing.
He told us how much he valued his independence and how he did not
want to give in to Mr. Bridges. We countered by explaining that he
would live independently in the new housing and that moving was not
the same as losing. He might not be victorious over Mr. Bridges, but
he was not losing because he was still getting housing from the Old
Town Housing Authority. Again, from one perspective, we were
practicing good lawyering. Good lawyers explain to their clients how
the clients' goals can be achieved through other means.' But from
another perspective, what we were doing was not so benign. We were
hearing Mr. Gaynor's words, but not necessarily being responsive to
the feelings they signified. The current apartment had great symbolic
value to our client. In addition, so did his battle with Mr. Bridges. As
compared to the first example above, this tactic came much closer to
trying to change our client's value set rather than merely making sure
he understood the consequences of his decision.' But, of course, it
was not as simple as that. I do think that lawyers should not allow
clients to assume that there is only one way to accomplish their goals
and/or satisfy their values. In retrospect, the question that arises for
me was whether we gave Mr. Gaynor's concerns the respect they were
due.79 I would like to answer that in the affirmative, but candor
76. As stated at supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text, we would have been
more willing to tolerate his knowing acceptance of a risky action.
77. In addition, we were willing to exercise what I call reversibility. Once he told
us that he was willing to move we reminded him of the reasons why he had told us he
did not want to move and asked if he still wanted to move. See supra Part I.
78. In some sense we were doing what Stewart Macaulay has described as
attempting to persuade our client that the case was about "adjustment between
competing claims and interests, rather than as one warranting a fight for principle."
Stewart Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws. 14 Law & Soc'y Rev.
115, 128 (1979).
79. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. Compare the comments of Howard
Lesnick:
I honestly do not think it matters which position the attorney takes-to
leave the final decision with the client or insist on keeping it- so much as I
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compels me to say I am not sure. I suspect that our behavior at times
may have seemed dismissive to him.
A third tactic we employed was not accepting at face value our
client's statements that he did not want to move. We continued to
schedule meetings with him to raise the possibility of accepting
another apartment as a possible resolution. We did not take no for an
answer. Moreover, to the extent he felt dependent on us or grateful
for our help, our constant repetition made it clear what we thought
the right answer was. Was our conduct unwarranted pressure orjustifiable persuasion? Unfortunately, the answer to this question
again depends upon one's judgments about Mr. Gaynor's competence.
If you conclude he was not processing the information properly, then
meeting with him to continue to discuss the issue seems warranted."
On the other hand, at some point, enough is enough, and continuing
to meet with him seems analogous to locking somebody in a room and
telling them they cannot leave until they do what you want. There is
some evidence Mr. Gaynor felt this kind of pressure. He finally
agreed with us most likely because we wore him down. The strongest
evidence of this is that when he was away from us, he changed his
mind. Of all the tactics we used, this one came closest to being
unwarranted pressure because it was the one tactic that was not
directed at providing "useful" information.
CONCLUSION
My goal in this Article has not been to provide final answers to the
question of how a lawyer should appropriately counsel the
questionably competent client. What I have attempted to do is add
detail and context to an ongoing dialogue begun by others."1 If we arejustified in treating the questionably competent client differently, we
first have to understand what the term questionably competent
means. I have suggested it has two plausible meanings: (1)
uncertainty as to whether somebody is competent; and (2) the idea
that competence is not an all or nothing concept, but one of degree. I
have also tried to illustrate the difficulty of relying on terms such as
manipulation or persuasion through discussion of a client's concrete
behaviors.
think it matters whether the attorney makes either decision in a way that
respects the concerns of both attorney and client, and treats the client as an
understanding independent person ....
Elizabeth Dvorkin et al., Becoming a Lawyer: A Humanistic Perspective on Legal
Education and Professionalism 202 (1981) (containing Howard Lesnick's comment).
80. We were told one effect of his head injury was that things needed to be
repeated for him to comprehend them.
81. See generally Margulies, Access, supra note 16; Tremblay, Persuasion and
Paternalism, supra note 3.
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My assessment is that we were most justified in emphasizing the
risks of litigation to our client, and least justified for continuing to
meet with him and not taking no for an answer until he agreed to
accept the offer of alternative housing. Perhaps this tactic was the
least justified because it seemed the least calculated to help the client
reach his own decision. More significantly, upon reflecting on this
case, I am struck that the description of these events and analyzing
them in discrete categories has introduced its own difficulties. When
we were working on this case, the issue of degree of competence and
the various tactics we employed were not separate and discrete items
or decisions, but rather inseparable. If we were sure he understood
the risks, we would have been more willing to accept his value choices
and we would have felt less compelled to meet with him continually to
go over the same ground. If the decision did not have what we viewed
to be such adverse consequences, then we would have been more
willing to tolerate our doubts about our client's competence.
In raising such questions I realize that this Article ultimately is not
only a meditation on a case, but also a meditation about stories or
case studies. Why do we use them? What value are they? Does this
story tell us anything about lawyers other than Mark Spiegel? To
what extent are stories that illustrate questions of professional
responsibility or ethics useful?' These two questions, in turn, present
issues that extend beyond this Article. First, are stories prescriptive or
helpful to individual lawyers faced with making choices? Second, I
am interested in how stories help us, if at all, in drafting rules of
conduct for lawyers. Is there some inherent conflict between the idea
that context and detail is all important and, therefore, stories are
necessary to provide that context and detail, and the idea that we need
general rules to govern lawyers' behavior; or do we need both? My
hunch is we need both, but that is another story.
82. On the larger debate about the significance of stories, compare, Daniel A.
Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov: Further Reflections
on Scholarship and Truth, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 647, 655-62 (1994) (concluding that
storytelling can enhance our understanding of the law), and Daniel A. Farber &
Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of Sdhook An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 Stan.
L. Rev. 807, 819-30 (1993) (discussing how stories can make a legitimate contribution
to legal scholarship), and Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse,
81 Geo. LJ. 251, 258-76 (1992) (arguing that accurate use of a specific case leads to a
general understanding of the law), with Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories,
79 Cal. L. Rev. 971, 973-82 (1991) (examining the pros and cons of feminist narratives
as a form of legal discourse), and Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. Cal. L
Rev. 255, 256-60 (1994) (exploring criticism about the power and effectiveness of legal
storytelling), and Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber
and Sherry, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 665, 666-67 (1993) (asserting that storytelling can be
limited in its efficacy).
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